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Abstract 
 
Comparative lawyers and economists have often assumed that traditional Chinese 
laws and customs reinforced the economic and political dominance of elites and, 
therefore, were unusually “despotic” towards the poor.  Such assumptions are highly 
questionable: Quite the opposite, one of the most striking characteristics of Qing and 
Republican property institutions is that they often gave significantly greater economic 
protection to the poorer segments of society than comparable institutions in early modern 
England.  In particular, Chinese property customs afforded much stronger powers of 
redemption to landowners who had pawned their land.  In both societies, land-pawning 
occurred far more frequently among poorer households than richer ones, but Chinese 
customary law allowed debtors to indefinitely retain redemption rights over collateralized 
property, whereas English debtors would generally lose the property permanently if they 
failed to redeem within one year. 
This article argues that the comparatively “egalitarian” tendencies of Qing and 
Republican property institutions stemmed from the different ways Chinese and English 
rural communities allocated social status and rank.  Hierarchical “Confucian” kinship 
networks dominated social and economic life in most Chinese villages. Within these 
networks, an individual’s status and rank depended, in large part, on his age and 
generational seniority, rather than personal wealth. This allowed many low-income 
households to enjoy status and rank quite disproportionate to their wealth. In comparison, 
substantial landed wealth was generally a prerequisite for high status in early modern 
England, effectively excluding lower-income households from positions of sociopolitical 
authority.  Chinese smallholders possessed, therefore, significantly more social 
bargaining power, and were more capable of negotiating desirable property institutions.  
Paradoxically, the predominance of kinship hierarchies actually enhanced macro-level 
political and economic equality. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the oldest and most influential assumptions about traditional Chinese law 
and custom is that they endorsed unusually severe socioeconomic inequality.  As one 
prominent comparative lawyer surmised quite recently, Chinese law and custom 
displayed, even in the early 20
th
 Century, “a strongly hierarchical view of society; a high 
value placed on harmony; . . . [and a] hierarchical structure of the society 
counterbalancing egalitarian organization.”1  These institutional hierarchies purportedly 
reinforced both the political and economic dominance of elites, but subjected most of the 
population to oppression and economic disparity
2—and therefore belonged in the same 
legal family as the Indian caste system or Japanese feudalism.
3
  Such assumptions remain 
resiliently influential in current debates over, for example, why the Chinese economy 
comparatively “underdeveloped” after the Eighteenth Century,4 and why Mainland China 
lacks the “rule of law.”5  The echoes of Max Weber and Karl Wittfogel, categorizing the 
Chinese legal tradition as “irrational,” or simply as “oriental despotism,” are 
inescapable.
6
 
At the same time, however, historians have increasingly realized that traditional 
Chinese property institutions afforded unusually high levels of economic protection to 
poorer rural households.
7
  Their egalitarian tendencies are especially poignant when 
                                                     
1
 Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 5, 39 (1997).  For similar sentiments, see, e.g., ZHANG JINFAN, ZHONGGUO FALÜ DE CHUANTONG YU 
JINDAI ZHUANXING [THE TRADITIONS AND EARLY MODERN TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE LAW] 72 (1997); 
GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 52-144 (1996); ROBERTO UNGER, 
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 93 (1976); DERK BODDE & 
CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 29-38 (1967); Amir N. Licht, et al., Culture rules: The 
foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659, 660, 684 (2007); 
John O. Haley, Law and Culture in China and Japan: A Framework for Analysis, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 895, 
906 (2006); Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1320 (2000); Albert H.Y. 
Chen, Towards a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 130 (2000) (summarizing the academic consensus in mainland China that traditional 
Chinese legal culture was “hierarchical and oppressive”); Teemu Ruskola,  Law, Sexual Morality, and 
Gender Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 2531, 2531-37 (1994). 
2
 E.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 112 (J. Sibree trans., 1956); THOMAS B. STEPHENS, 
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MIXED COURT, 1911-27, at 115 (1992); KARL A. 
WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957); Chen, supra note 1; 
ZHANG, supra note 1.  
3
 Mattei, supra note 1. 
4
 Some of the best-known examples include DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS 
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY 117 (2010) (attributing Chinese 
underdevelopment to the unchecked power of its ruling elite); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL 
CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 124 (M. Pensky, Trans., 2001) (arguing that Asian societies must 
discard their hierarchical legal institutions to achieve capitalist modernity); ERIC L. JONES, GROWTH 
RECURRING: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN WORLD HISTORY 130-46 (1988); and WITTFOGEL, supra note 2. 
5
 E.g., Licht et al., supra note 1; Haley, supra note 1, at 915. 
6
 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1063 (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds., 1968); MAX 
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 232-44 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954).  For criticism, see Robert 
M. Marsh, Weber’s Misunderstanding of Chinese Law, 106 AM. J. SOCIOL. 281 (2000).  On oriental 
despotism, see WITTFOGEL, supra note 1. 
7
 E.g., Robert Brenner & Christopher Isett, England’s Divergence from China’s Yangtze Delta: Property 
Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 609 (2002); Robert C. 
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compared with early modern Western, particularly English, property institutions.  One 
especially compelling example is the redemption of collateralized property, a vital 
concern for lower-income households that relied on land-pawning instruments—“dian” 
sales (“conditional sales”) in Qing and Republican China8 and mortgages in early modern 
England—for monetary liquidity.9  Despite vigorous opposition by the wealthiest 
segments of society, customary law in most of China granted “dian” sellers—in other 
words, “land pawnors”—an essentially unlimited right of redemption, viable for decades 
after the initial sale.
10
  In comparison, early modern English institutions generally 
allowed creditors to permanently seize mortgaged land if the debtor failed to repay within 
a year, thereby encouraging the aggressive consolidation of land into large private 
estates.
11
 
Can these two themes, one of prevalent sociolegal hierarchy and one of strongly 
egalitarian property institutions, coexist in our understanding of the Chinese legal 
tradition?  One possible solution is to portray both as symptoms of a backward, 
“premodern” society.  Several historians have, indeed, attributed the peculiarly strong 
protection of land redemption rights in Chinese property customs to certain cultural, even 
semi-religious, characteristics that directly encouraged such protection: Chinese rural 
communities adhered, they claim, to “precommerical” moral ideals of “permanence in 
landholding,” partially due to the lack of market integration, labor mobility, and 
economic specialization.
12
  This largely concurs with the Wittfogelian perception of 
China as an immobile, underdeveloped society locked into rigid hierarchies. 
The problem, however, is that pre-industrial China was far from “precommercial.”  
Recent scholarship demonstrates that Chinese households, wealthy and poor alike, were 
economically rational and ruthlessly self-interested.
13
  In addition, the economy was 
significantly market-based, while land ownership was increasingly commoditized and 
impersonal.
14
  There is, in fact, no real evidence that people agreed on “precommercial” 
ideals of “permanence in landholding.”  Quite the opposite, this article presents 
considerable evidence that property norms, particularly “dian” redemption norms, were 
generally the product of fiercely self-interested negotiation: Higher-income households 
tended to resist generous “dian” redemption norms, whereas smallholders were almost 
                                                                                                                                                              
Ellickson, The Cost of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China (Yale Law & Econ. Research 
Paper no.441, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1953207; Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-
Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011). 
8
 Qing rule over China ran from 1644 to 1912.  The Republican era ran from 1912 to 1949. 
9
 PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC 
COMPARED 71-98 (2001); Zhang, supra note 7, at 156-74. 
10
 Zhang, supra note 7, at 156-74. 
11
 Id. at 175-86; 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143-46 (1904). 
12
 HUANG, supra note 9, at 74; MELISSA MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION 
MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 234 (1998). 
13
 See Lynda S. Bell, Farming, Sericulture, and Peasant Rationality in Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth 
Century, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207, 226-29, 232-39 (Thomas G. Rawski & 
Lillian M. Li eds., 1992). 
14
 On markets and commercialization, see, e.g., LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN, 
1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998); and KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, EUROPE, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 86-87 (2000).  On the commoditization of land, see 
THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000). 
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uniformly in favor.  A broadly similar situation existed in early modern England, where 
both large landholders and smallholders pushed for property norms that advanced their 
economic interests.  The difference, however, is that Chinese smallholders were 
significantly more successful in obtaining favorable institutions than their English 
counterparts. 
But why?  If we simply believe—as many scholars continue to do—that Chinese 
sociolegal hierarchies bred unusually severe class-based political and economic 
oppression and “oriental despotism,” then why were Chinese smallholders comparatively 
successful in the negotiation of key property institutions?  As noted above, large 
landholders rarely conceded these institutions willingly, but were simply unable to 
overturn them.  In what sense, then, was the Chinese legal tradition truly hierarchical? 
This article argues that Chinese property institutions were comparatively 
egalitarian precisely because Chinese law and society was deeply “hierarchical.”  This 
requires, however, that we reject any variation of the old “oriental despotism” thesis in 
favor of a more nuanced understanding of Chinese sociolegal hierarchies.  In other words, 
the Chinese legal tradition was indeed “hierarchical,” but not in the sense that it helped a 
wealthy political elite dominate and oppress the poorer masses.  Although late imperial 
laws did indeed endorse certain status inequalities between state officials and commoners, 
they were of limited macro-level significance: Officials were few in number, and wielded 
little influence in local affairs.  Correspondingly, some historians have come to realize 
that the most important hierarchies in Chinese law and society—those that truly affected 
every level of socioeconomic life—were instead between senior and junior relatives: 
between parents and children, uncles and nephews, elder brothers and younger brothers.
15
  
The sociopolitical dominance of senior relatives over junior ones was not merely 
enshrined in formal and customary law, but was probably internalized as a foundational 
moral principle by most of the Qing and Republican population. 
But what even these scholars have missed is that these “Confucian” kinship 
hierarchies enhanced, rather than undermined, political equality between rich and poor.  
Their predominance in rural society—compared to the relative “individualism” of early 
modern English society—was, in fact, the very reason Chinese property norms protected 
lower-income households more rigorously than corresponding English institutions.   
The following pages will demonstrate that the social status and rank of most 
individuals in Qing and Republican China depended significantly on their generational 
seniority within their respective patrilineal descent groups.  In contrast, the importance of 
kinship and communal ties in rural English society precipitously declined in late 
Medieval and early modern times.
16
  The tighter social fabric of rural China was 
indisputably more “hierarchical”—elder kinsmen wielded extensive legal and customary 
authority over younger ones—but also conferred large status benefits on lower-income 
households: Because status was so closely tied to age and generational seniority, the 
system guaranteed significant status mobility within most individual lifetimes.  People 
automatically gained status as they aged, theoretically independent of personal wealth.   
                                                     
15
 See discussion at infra, pp. _-_. 
16
 ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL 
TRANSITION (1978); David Cressy, Kinship and Kin Interaction in Early Modern England, 113 PAST & 
PRESENT 38, 41 (1986); H.R. French & Richard Hoyle, English Individualism Refuted and Reasserted: the 
Case of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550-1750, 56 ECON. HIST. REV. 595 (2003). 
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In practice, of course, wealth remained a valuable social asset, but even so, lower-
income seniors could frequently obtain status and authority quite disproportionate to their 
wealth.  Even this weaker claim is significant in a comparative context: By most accounts, 
significant landholding was a strict prerequisite for higher status in rural England, leading 
to the near-monopolization of sociopolitical authority by the wealthy.
17
  The cumulative 
social status and authority of smallholders and tenants was, therefore, much higher in 
China than in England. 
Higher status naturally led to stronger bargaining positions in the negotiation of 
property norms.  In both early modern China and England, property norms were more 
often shaped by local custom rather than formal law.  In other words, they were generally 
negotiated within local communities.  Differences between Chinese and English property 
norms reflected, therefore, the different local power balances at play in such negotiations:  
Because Chinese smallholders and tenants cumulatively possessed higher social status 
than their English peers, Chinese property norms protected their immediate economic 
interests far more vigorously than English norms. 
This thesis does not postulate the existence of some “Confucian welfare state”18 in 
China.  The imperial Chinese state did support some social welfare programs—notably 
disaster relief granaries
19—but embraced no sweeping ideology of socioeconomic 
equality.  There is similarly no evidence, as discussed above, to suggest that local 
economic elites were substantively more sympathetic towards their poorer countrymen or 
townsmen than English ones.  The primary difference was not one of generosity or 
attitude, but simply that Chinese economic elites were less able to impose their will on 
poorer households.
20
 
The redemption of pawned land was hardly the only area where Chinese property 
norms were more egalitarian than English ones.  For example, Qing and Republican local 
customs also favored poorer households over richer ones in crucial aspects of tenancy 
regulation.  Most notably, Lower Yangtze customs regularly allowed and protected the 
right of “permanent tenancy” (“yong dian”), in which landlords lost the right to raise 
rents or evict tenants.
21
  Early modern English landlords suffered no comparable 
handicaps and were notoriously ruthless in the eviction of tenants and consolidation of 
estates.
22
  The model of custom formation presented here may explain, therefore, several 
key differences between Chinese and English property institutions, although the article 
can examine only one in detail. 
While the primary goal of this article is to explain a major historical phenomenon 
and revise our understanding of traditional Chinese sociolegal hierarchies, it also 
                                                     
17
 KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 43 (2003); H.R. French, Social Status, Localism 
and the ‘Middle Sort of People’ in England, 1620-1750, 166 PAST & PRESENT 66 (2000). 
18
 On state welfarism in Chinese history, see R. BIN WONG, CHINA TRANSFORMED: HISTORICAL CHANGE 
AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE (1997).  
19
 See, e.g., LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN NORTH CHINA (2007). 
20
 See discussion at infra, pp. _-_. 
21
 E.g., HUANG, supra note 9, at 99-118; KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: 
THE LOWER YANGTZE REGION, 1840-1950, at 21-27 (1992). 
22
 See THE BRENNER DEBATE 10-67 (T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1987); R.W. Hoyle, Tenure and 
the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate, 43 ECON. HIST. 
REV. 1 (1990).  Although scholars involved in the “Brenner Debate” vehemently disagreed over whether 
landlord aggression could explain the Seventeenth Century Anglo-French economic divergence, all agreed 
that such aggression was indeed prevalent in England. 
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connects to a broader theoretical literature on social norms.  For decades, sociologists and 
economists—particularly their respective reincarnations within the legal academy—have 
debated the roles of culture and historical tradition in the creation of social norms.  To 
crudely summarize a long debate, the former group has generally argued that the societal 
“internalization” of cultural and moral values plays a crucial role in norm creation, 
whereas the latter sees norm creation as predominantly a bargaining process between 
rationally self-interested individuals.
23
  Law and economics scholars point out, surely 
correctly, that traditional sociological studies often treated cultures as consolidated 
“operative engines” without carefully considering whether self-interested rationality 
could explain many phenomena they considered ideological or “cultural.”24  On the other 
hand, many have criticized rational choice-based theories for failing to satisfactorily 
reflect the complexity of social reality.
25
  
A more recent strand of scholarship, sometimes termed “law and socioeconomics,” 
attempts to bridge the gap between these two approaches by simply acknowledging that 
some norms are rationally negotiated while others are internalized.
26
  This begs the 
question, however, of which norms are which, and whether there are predictable patterns 
of interaction between the two categories.  Some have hypothesized the existence of 
“pyramids of norms,” in which higher tier norms, potentially created via internalization 
of core religious or cultural values, set the parameters within which lower tier norms are 
rationally negotiated.
27
  A supporting contention is that certain kinds of norms, 
particularly those governing basic social interactions such as kinship and core religious 
affinity, are more prone to internalization than explicitly economic norms such as 
                                                     
23
 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 537, 542 
(1998); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 157, 158 
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 625. 
24
 Ellickson, supra note 23.  For a specific example, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003), which 
applies a political economy methodology to the study of the Japanese judiciary.  Their work has been 
challenged on multiple fronts, including methodological ones. Frank Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful 
Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 L. SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005); JOHN OWEN 
HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (2006).  
25
 See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1602 
(2000).  See also PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1990) (developing a 
theory of “habitus” that counters rational choice theories).  Rational choice theories struggle, in particular, 
to explain how rational individuals desist from free-riding on norm enforcement and adherence.  Although 
certain evolutionary game theory models claim to explain social cooperation under fixed conditions, e.g., 
Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolution of Norms, 106 AM. J. SOCIOL. 1493 (2001), those 
conditions often seem unrealistic: for example, that players interact one-on-one even in an n-person game 
and possess perfect information.  Id. at 1533-34.  Some have attempted to bypass these difficulties by 
suggesting that withholding or conferring esteem is “costless.”  Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICHIGAN LAW REV. 338 (1997).  This, too, seems 
implausible—reputational injury provokes retaliation just as readily as material injury.  Suggestions that 
people obey or enforce social norms to “signal” future cooperation, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS (2000), have also been criticized.  See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, 
Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 643-54, 663-68 (2000). 
26
 E.g., Mark A. Edwards, Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights, 43 CONN. L. REV. 457, 464-75 (2010); 
Etzioni, supra note 23, at 158; Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 UNIV. 
PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
27
 E.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1989); Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: 
Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L & ECON. 715 (2008). 
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property and contract norms.
28
  This is conceivably because people are usually exposed to 
the former at a younger age, when personal values are still in their formative stage.
29
 
By narrowly defining the content and scope of internalized values, and by laying 
out the precise mechanisms through which they affect calculations of self-interest, the 
“pyramids” thesis aspires to provide an empirically testable account of how cultural 
factors shape social norms.  It hopes to solve, therefore, the so-called “Sen’s Paradox,” 
referring to Amartya Sen’s call for theories of socioeconomic behavior that both “bring in 
something outside individual choice behavior,” but also avoid speaking of “society’s 
‘preferences’” in such aggregate terms that no empirical testing is possible.30  At the 
moment, however, very little empirical verification of the “pyramids” thesis exists. 
The historical account presented here fills in some of that empirical void.  It 
demonstrates how internalized communal values shaped the negotiation of property 
norms by institutionalizing the allocation of social status and authority among interested 
parties.  Within this rudimentary “pyramid of norms,” “Confucian” kinship hierarchies 
were the “higher tier” norm that defined the parameters within which self-interested 
parties negotiated “lower tier” property norms. 
Geographically, it makes little sense to compare England with all of China due to 
the enormous socioeconomic variance between Chinese macroregions.  Instead, this 
article focuses on two comparatively developed coastline regions: the Lower Yangtze and 
North China.
31
  Temporally, it focuses on the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Centuries for England and the 
later Qing and Republican eras for China.  Most of its Chinese primary sources fall 
within 1865-1940, a period of relative social stability in most rural localities, despite 
turmoil on the national political stage.  The goal here is to compare societies at similar 
stages of economic development: both England and the two Chinese macroregions 
boasted significantly commercialized economies on the cusp of industrialization;
32
 both 
were predominantly agricultural and self-contained, but had some access to maritime 
trade;
33
 finally, both recognized and protected private property rights through law and 
custom.
34
  Rigorous analysis and comparison would be impossible without these broad 
similarities.  By the early 18
th
 Century, overseas trade would occupy a much greater share 
of the English economy, making it significantly less comparable to any Chinese 
macroregion. 
A final word about the use of “egalitarian” in this article: Although the term 
“egalitarian” may be used to describe any kind of equality-promoting behavior or 
                                                     
28
 Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating 
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1643, 1661-62 (1996); Licht, supra note 27, at 721. 
29
 Licht, supra note 27, at 721. 
30
 Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495, 498 (1993). 
31
 On North China, see PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH 
CHINA (1985); KENNETH POMERANZ, THE MAKING OF A HINTERLAND: STATE, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY IN 
INLAND NORTH CHINA, 1853-1937 (1993).  On the Lower Yangtze, see LI, supra note 14. 
32
 See supra note 14 
33
 For the relative unimportance of trade to the early modern English economy, see RALPH DAVIS, THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 63 (1979).  Cf. The Rise of Europe: Atlantic 
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. R. 546 (2005), which argues that trade 
was institutionally important even if statistically modest. 
34
 See Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN 
EARLY MODERN CHINA 17 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & Robert Gardella eds., Stanford Univ. 
Press 2004). 
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policy,
35
 within this article’s context, it specifically describes institutions and actions that 
promote the political and economic interests of lower-income households.  It is also used 
in a purely descriptive sense, without ideological connotations attached. 
Part One discusses common assumptions about sociolegal “hierarchy” in early 
modern China.  Part Two outlines some examples where Chinese property norms were 
unusually protective of smallholders, drawing comparisons with corresponding English 
institutions that favored the economic interests of higher-income households.  Part Three 
unpacks a model of social norm negotiation that explains why the existence of 
“Confucian” social hierarchies actually enhanced egalitarianism in property institutions.  
Part Four, the article’s empirical core, tests this model against a wide array of historical 
data, including court cases, contracts, rural surveys, and lineage registries.  The 
Conclusion further discusses the theoretical significance of these findings. 
Part One: Hierarchy and Law in Pre-Industrial China 
 
 The argument that law and custom in imperial China was “hierarchical” is as old 
as the field of Chinese legal history.  Insofar as scholars even acknowledged China had 
“law,”36 they rarely failed to describe that “law” as, more or less, “a moral code calling 
for inequality and hierarchy,”37 and therefore a tool of political control that could not lead 
to genuine “rule of law.”38  For many, the study of Chinese law and custom was, and 
remains, no more than the “the scholarly study of obsequious submission to authority and 
hierarchy.”39   The many logical problems with that reasoning aside, the more 
fundamental question is: “hierarchical” in what sense?   
 “Hierarchy” is an analytically useless term unless it is further specified and 
elaborated: Hierarchy of whom over whom?  Under what conditions?  With what kinds of 
privileges?  Although vast numbers of scholars have made the “imperial Chinese law and 
society were hierarchical” argument, few have addressed these questions with detail or 
nuance.  For a very long time, the dominant image of Chinese legal hierarchies was 
simply some version of “oriental despotism” and class oppression: Law and local custom 
alike were created by a narrow class of elites who utilized institutions at all levels—
including, but not limited to, unfair advantages in government recruiting, uneven tax 
duties, and favorable property norms—to protect their core self-interests, largely to the 
political and economic detriment of other classes.
40
  As one legal article stated, “[f]or 
                                                     
35
 Egalitarianism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/ 
(last visited March 7, 2013) (“An egalitarian favors equality of some sort: People should get the same, or be 
treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect.”). 
36
 This was disturbingly rare even a few years ago.  See William P. Alford, Law, Law, What Law?: Why 
Western Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not Had More to Say about Its Law, 23 MODERN 
CHINA 398 (1997); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002). 
37
 Ruskola, supra note 1, at 2531. 
38
 See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 46 (2002); Tom 
Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 767 (2002) (summarizing previous literature); Haley, supra note 1, at 915.   
39
 STEPHENS, supra note 2. 
40
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centuries, Chinese concepts of property rights were rooted in strongly autocratic 
Confucian doctrine that enshrined and vindicated hierarchy, authority and inequality.”41  
For the most part, this remains the academic dogma in mainland China, where major 
legal history narratives almost universally decry the “feudal” and “oppressive” nature of 
imperial institutions.
42
   
Such oppression purportedly generated severe wealth disparity, lack of social 
mobility, and, ultimately, relative economic decline: elite domination stifled free 
entrepreneurialism and technological innovation, created tremendous social unrest, and 
left the rural economy vulnerable to natural disasters.
43
  Insofar as Chinese immigrants 
have been economically successful in other parts of the world, their success supposedly 
stems from the disintegration of traditional sociopolitical hierarchies and greater mobility 
in immigrant communities.
44
 
The image of a dominant elite ruling the country is not entirely unsubstantiated: 
Legal culture, even in the Ming and Qing, certainly privileged certain social groups over 
others.  The emperor was largely beyond formal legal sanction, and the law afforded 
special statuses, including exemption from most taxes and legal prosecution, to his 
extended family.
45
  More generally, Manchu bannermen possessed economic privileges 
not available to Han Chinese throughout the Qing,
46
 while high-level national 
examination degree holders enjoyed significant political and social advantages over lower 
level scholars or non-degree holders.
47
 
To portray these privileges as the symptoms of class-based institutional 
oppression is, however, to exaggerate the sociopolitical clout of these elites.  They 
occupied, first of all, a tiny portion of the population.  Due to stubborn government 
reluctance to expand examination degree quotas in proportion to population growth, 
degree-holders of any level were extremely rare in the Qing—far lower than one percent 
of total population.
48
  Imperial clan members were, of course, even rarer.  Even 
bannermen did not exceed a few percentage points of the total and, in any case, had lost 
much of their privileged status by the Nineteenth Century.
49
  To put this in comparative 
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perspective, titled nobility comprised perhaps two percent of early modern England’s 
population,
50
 to say nothing of the far more numerous landed gentry.  More importantly, 
the Qing state was very limited: its small size severely dampened tax collection and law 
enforcement powers, forcing local officials to leave most administrative and rulemaking 
duties to communal, guild or kinship based self-governance.
51
 
Perhaps aware of these flaws in the traditional “elite despotism” thesis, scholars 
have increasingly pointed to “Confucian” kinship institutions as a more comparatively 
significant source of sociopolitical hierarchy
52
: Virtually all segments of Qing society 
recognized systematic inequalities between different family members.
53
  Parents naturally 
occupied a higher sociolegal position than their offspring, as did uncles over nephews, 
and elder brothers or cousins over younger ones.  Physically assaulting a parent, for 
example, was punishable by death, whereas beating one’s child was perfectly acceptable.  
Even disobedience or rudeness to a senior relative could constitute a punishable offense, 
if not by law then by lineage self-regulation or local custom.  Unsurprisingly, major 
socioeconomic decisions were generally made by the household patriarch in consultation 
with other senior male members of his kinship group.  Relatives also enjoyed certain 
economic privileges over non-relatives: Many local customs dictated, at least nominally, 
that landowners offer their land to relatives first when exploring sale options, and only 
sell to non-relatives if those offers are unsuccessful.
54
  
Kinship hierarchies retained much of their vitality even after the Qing’s collapse.  
Republican legal codes narrowed the range of privileges afforded to senior relatives, but 
did not eliminate them altogether.
55
  For example, killing or assaulting a senior relative 
continued to be punished more severely than usual homicide or assault.
56
  More 
importantly, the great majority of local communities continued to recognize and enforce 
traditional kinship hierarchies throughout the Republican era, and many do so even 
today.
57
 
Despite their immense historical importance, how Confucian kinship hierarchies 
affected society-wide distributions of wealth and sociopolitical status is hardly 
understood, if at all.  Most pieces simply ignore the issue.  Scholars of considerable 
reputation but questionable exposure to Chinese history, most famously Jürgen Habermas, 
have attempted to dismiss the compatibility of kinship institutions with economic and 
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social “modernity” in broad, but clearly misguided, strokes: Because familial hierarchies 
are supposedly incompatible with normative certainty and predictability, “Asiatic 
societies cannot participate in capitalistic modernization without taking advantage of the 
achievements of an individualistic legal order.”58  Others, particularly mainland Chinese 
scholars, attempt to conflate kinship hierarchies with the despotism thesis, arguing that 
the former encouraged habitual submission to authority that supported the latter.
59
 
There may be some truth to that, but as this Article will demonstrate, whether in 
the creation of property and contract institutions or in the local distribution of political 
authority, kinship hierarchies weakened class and wealth-based oppression.  In the very 
limited sense that they recognized status differences between different individuals, 
kinship institutions were indeed “hierarchical.”  From a broader perspective, however, the 
term “hierarchical” masks some fairly unique characteristics: Unlike in other social 
hierarchies that tied status strictly to heritage, including most feudal or caste-based 
societies, the category of privileged persons was very fluid under Confucian norms.  As 
one aged and had children, he or she automatically gained legal and customary authority 
over younger generations.  Normatively, wealth did not affect status within kinship 
groups.  A wealthy nephew owed the same sociolegal obligations to a penniless uncle as 
a penniless nephew to a wealthy one. 
However counterintuitively, these kinship hierarchies should theoretically have 
promoted, rather than damaged, status mobility, simply because everyone aged, which 
automatically boosted their status and rank both within and beyond their kinship network.  
This latter point requires some elaboration: Most kinship networks were of considerable 
size—several dozen households in North China, and considerably more than that in the 
Lower Yangtze—and, therefore, carried enough collective clout that high rank within the 
kinship network generally translated also into relatively high status beyond its borders.   
Because kinship hierarchies were theoretically disconnected from wealth, they 
should have empowered large numbers of low-income but high-seniority individuals 
against their wealthier kin and, therefore, should have helped level the cumulative 
sociopolitical balance between rich and poor.  In crude terms, even the wealthiest 
individuals probably had poorer relatives who were of similar or higher generational 
seniority.  It was, hypothetically, a system were systematic individual inequality led to 
macro-level equality between rich and poor.   
As the remainder of this Article will demonstrate, even in practice, Confucian 
social hierarchies generated enough status mobility to inject much socioeconomic 
egalitarianism into China’s property and contract institutions—in fact, significantly more 
than what one finds in early modern English norms.  Late imperial and Republican 
property customs often offered superior protection to lower-income households than 
comparable institutions in England.  More importantly, they did so precisely because 
kinship hierarchies remained strong in China, whereas English society had become 
“individualistic.”  This hardly meant that affluent Chinese households harbored greater 
sympathy towards poorer kinsmen, but rather that kinship hierarchies facilitated 
cumulative status equality amongst even the most self-interested of people. 
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Part Two: The Relative Egalitarianism of Chinese Property Institutions 
 
 For such a “hierarchical” legal culture, Chinese laws and customs could often be 
astonishingly “soft” towards lower income households.  The full extent of this is best 
appreciated—perhaps only appreciated, considering the virtual impossibility of imagining 
what “wealth-neutral” property norms look like—in a comparative context.  The choice 
here to compare Chinese property institutions with early modern English ones draws 
from both the intellectual appeal of the “Great Divergence” literature60 and, as seen 
below, from the innate analytical cogency of that comparison. 
 This Article focuses primarily on norms that regulated, for lack of a better term, 
“land pawning”—transactions that allowed a cash-needy landholder to collateralize his 
holdings for a large sum, equal to most or even all of its full market value.  Such 
instruments were crucial to the development of mature land markets and monetary 
liquidity in early modern economies, where land was the prime source of capital and 
livelihood, and therefore sold with considerable reluctance.  As the author has discussed 
elsewhere, the primary instrument for land collateralization—in fact, the only instrument 
commonly available to landholders—was the mortgage in early modern England, and the 
“dian” (“conditional sale”) in Qing and Republican China.61 
 Compared to modern Anglo-American mortgages, the “classic mortgage” of 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England was a duller instrument.  Modern mortgages 
allow, of course, repayment schedules of up to several decades, generally permit the 
mortgagor to maintain possession of the property, and, in cases of default, arrange 
foreclosure auctions to raise the collateral’s full market value.62  The classic mortgage 
was not nearly as lenient to mortgagors: First, mortgagees were allowed to possess the 
land while waiting for repayment.
63
  More importantly, most local customs dictated that 
mortgagors must repay their debts within a very short time-frame—generally six months 
to a year after the initial conveyance, or the mortgagees would automatically obtain full 
ownership of the collateral.
64
 
Up until the early Eighteenth Century, Common Law courts enforced these 
customary deadlines quite ruthlessly, so much that Chancery felt compelled to aid 
beleaguered mortgagors by establishing “the equity of redemption,” allowing judges to 
extend redemption deadlines and demand foreclosure auctions upon final default.
65
  
These reforms did not, however, harden into established doctrine until the mid-
Eighteenth Century, and even then, their prominence over Common Law rules was 
questionable.
66
 
 The cash-needy landowner in early modern China faced far more favorable 
institutional conditions.  Most Qing and Republican land transactions were not permanent 
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sales, but rather “dian” (“conditional”) sales, where the “dian” “seller” conveyed land to 
the “buyer” for 60 to 80 percent of the property’s full market value, but retained the right 
to redeem at zero interest.
67
  The “dian” buyer’s interest in lending money under such an 
arrangement was not monetary interest, but whatever profit the land could yield before 
the seller redeemed.  He was, therefore, often protected by contractually-established 
“guaranteed usage periods” (“xian”) of one or more years, during which the seller could 
not redeem.
68
  In addition, he could obtain full ownership of the land if the “dian” seller 
agreed to convert the transaction into a permanent sale (“mai”), upon which the seller 
would receive “additional payments” (“zhaotie”) that made up the difference between the 
original transaction price and the land’s present market value.69 
 Most significantly, “dian” customs generally allowed “dian” sellers to retain 
redemption rights ad infinitum.  As one local custom stated, “dian” sales “could be 
redeemed after several hundred years, and the price of redemption would always remain 
the same.”70  Similar customs were commonplace throughout China’s core regions, 
particularly North China and the Lower Yangtze.
71
  Many explicitly forbid the original 
contract from setting any redemption deadline.  Others allowed redemption rights to be 
exercised “any time after the guaranteed-usage period’s expiration.”  These rules were 
not for show: Under their influence, very few “dian” contracts attempted to establish 
redemption deadlines, and most “dian” sales were apparently redeemed at some point.72  
Local legal archives contain, moreover, numerous cases where a “dian” seller or his 
descendants attempted to redeem after astonishingly long periods—sometimes a century.   
 This was an institutional arrangement rife with social tension.  During the decades 
that often passed between “dian” sale and redemption request, families might move, 
original contractors might die, or usage rights might be transferred to a third party.  The 
swelling volume of related disputes brought before local courts eventually pushed the 
central government into action: It made several attempts to limit the redemption window 
of “dian” sales, ordering first in the Qing Code that all contracts must explicitly indicate 
whether they were permanent sales or “dian” sales,73 and then, in the 1758 Board of 
Finance Regulations, that regular “dian” sales must be redeemed within ten years or be 
converted to a permanent sale, with at most a one-year extension.
74
 
 Enforcement of these legal rules, however, was weak.  A survey of local case 
archives from the later Qing suggests that the great majority of redemption deadline 
cases—where the “dian” buyer refused to allow redemption because too much time had 
passed since the original contract—were eventually settled via external mediation, often 
at the court’s behest.75  Due to their lack of coercive authority, local magistrates were 
hesitant to formally adjudicate cases where central laws and regulations conflicted with 
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local custom.  This is unsurprising, as historians have long emphasized the serious 
weakness of the Qing state in local governance, especially in the regulation of 
commercial activity.
76
 
 By the Republican era, the government had basically admitted that Qing rules 
against excessive redemption were unenforceable: early Republican-era governments 
extended the national deadline for land redemption to sixty years, a clear concession to 
local custom.
77
  After 1929, the newly-victorious Nationalist government attempted to 
impose a thirty year deadline nationwide,
78
 but surveys of Northern Chinese peasants 
conducted a decade later suggest that their efforts were ineffectual: Most peasants had no 
knowledge of it, and most who did believed that no one followed it.
79
 
 For “dian” sellers, these customary norms offered tremendous advantages with 
very limited downside.  The most obvious evidence of this is that, in the variety of 
disputes examined below, “dian” sellers universally argued in favor of these norms, 
whereas “dian” buyers were almost always opposed.  This is unsurprising: Land was, to 
most rural residents in these early modern times, the single most valuable kind of 
property, not only because of its high market value but also because it was the foundation 
of most economic production.  As various Qing and Republican era sources repeatedly 
claim, landowners generally sold land only when financial conditions made it absolutely 
necessary, and therefore usually preferred redeemable “dian” sales to permanent ones.80  
Under these conditions, an institutional framework that effectively eliminated the danger 
of default and seizure was highly attractive to cash-strapped landowners.   
“Dian” sellers did lose some contractual freedom under this arrangement, but not 
much.  They could not contractually establish a deadline for redemption even if they 
wanted to.  Removing the possibility of default did not, however, remove the possibility 
of permanent alienation: If, after the original contract, the “dian” seller ever wished to 
permanently convey his land, he could simply request an additional payment (“zhaotie”), 
converting the “dian” sale into a permanent one at full market value.81  A more serious 
concern might be that the inability to impose redemption deadlines would be priced into 
“dian” prices, which were, in fact, only 60 to 80 percent of the land’s full value.  Because, 
however, most “dian” sales were made under considerable financial stress, a lower “dian” 
value, so long as it covered immediate needs, was a far smaller concern than obtaining 
extended redemption rights.  Moreover, there were ways to negotiate higher “dian” prices: 
the seller could simply grant a longer guaranteed-usage period (“xian”), which gave 
buyers greater security and larger returns.   
On the other hand, customary law did “dian” buyers few favors.  The constant 
danger of redemption after the guaranteed-usage period’s expiration seriously decreased 
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the land’s value to buyers by discouraging both long-term investments to improve the 
land and use of the land as a reliable source of capital or collateral.
82
  The tremendous 
attractiveness of “dian” customs to potential land sellers also drained the supply of 
permanent land sales, further exacerbating the difficulty of secure land accumulation.
83
  
Despite all this, the demand for “dian” sales remained high during times of relative peace, 
driven by a combination of population growth, commercialization, and nascent 
industrialization.  All in all, “dian” selling was a strikingly low-risk affair in early modern 
China, especially when compared to the perils of English mortgaging.  
Not surprisingly, the economic identities of creditors and debtors were broadly 
similar across the two countries: both mortgagors and “dian” sellers were generally much 
poorer compared to mortgagees and “dian” buyers.  The historical literature is 
remarkably consistent on this: Few would dispute that the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries were, in England, a time of massive wealth and land concentration from small 
tenants and lesser yeomen into the hands of large capitalist farmers.
84
  The process, in its 
earlier stages, relied primarily on land transactions—sales and mortgages, driven on the 
supply side by falling grain prices and shrinking agricultural profit margins—rather than 
enclosure.
85
  Although China did not experience any comparable flood of land 
engrossment, its overall pattern of land transaction was nonetheless from poorer 
households to wealthier ones.  In one fairly typical North China village, for example, 
around 85% of “dian” sellers during the later 1930s possessed less land than the village 
average, and nearly 40% possessed less than a third of that average.  In contrast, less than 
3% belonged to the top 25% of landowners.
86
  Additional circumstantial evidence can be 
found in contract collections from late Qing and Republican era Zhejiang Province: They 
commonly show one household conditionally buying multiple parcels from a wide 
assortment of sellers, which certainly suggests that a few relatively wealthy households 
were aggressively acquiring land from numerous poorer ones.
87
 
The institutional protection of “dian” sellers was, therefore, also the protection of 
poor against rich.  Likewise, the harsh treatment of mortgagors in English custom usually 
meant harsh treatment of smallholders and tenants in favor of aggressively expanding 
gentry and capitalist farmers.  Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the institutional 
contrast between “dian” and mortgage significantly explains why landholding was more 
equitable in China than in England
88: “Landlords” and “large farmers” owned only 40 to 
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50 percent of arable land throughout the later Qing and Republic, and managed less than 
15 percent.
89
  In comparison, conventional estimates of landownership by the English 
royalty, nobility and gentry range from 65 to 75 percent of total land in 1690, 85 in 1790, 
and 90 by 1873.
90
  Moreover, “capitalist,” managerial farms dominated agricultural 
production as early as 1700, largely by squeezing out smallholders and converting them 
into paid labor.  “Dian” redemption norms were instrumental in preventing the large-
scale centralization of land in China, whereas mortgage laws were similarly important in 
facilitating the very same process in England. 
Land redemption was not the only major area of property regulation where 
Chinese local customs were significantly more accommodating towards the economically 
disadvantaged.  The same characterization also applies to customs and laws governing 
tenant eviction and rent adjustment: Since at least the Eighteenth Century, local customs 
across the Lower Yangtze and South China recognized rights of “permanent tenancy” 
(“yong dian”), an endless tenancy that permitted eviction or rent-raising only if unpaid 
rents had exceeded the property’s full value.91  Responding to petitions by frustrated 
landlords, several provinces enacted regulations outlawing such arrangements, but 
generally failed to enforce them.
92
 
The closest analogy to permanent tenancy in early modern England was probably 
the copyhold of inheritance.  Established by manorial custom rather than the Common 
Law, such tenancies usually had no fixed term, paid only a nominal rent, could be 
inherited, sold, mortgaged or subleased just as freehold land, and were not subject to 
direct evictions.  Creation of copyholds, however, had progressively slowed during the 
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, and had largely vanished by the Seventeenth.
93
  Quite 
the opposite, landlords encumbered by copyholds were busy revoking copyhold rights, 
usually by unilaterally raising rents or inheritance and conveyance fees.
94
  Copyholders 
who converted their holdings into leasehold land under such pressure became tenants in 
the modern sense: they held only for a fixed term of years, and could not pass the tenancy 
to their heirs without the landlord’s express approval.   
How, then, can we tally the stronger economic egalitarianism of Chinese property 
norms, which came at significant inconvenience and cost to the wealthiest segments of 
society, with the common perception of Chinese law and custom as fundamentally 
hierarchical and unequal?  Could a legal framework that embraced innate individual 
inequality also promote cumulative economic equality?  It depends, as alluded to in Part 
One, on which concept of hierarchy we employ—class-based despotism or kinship-
based—and how we unpack their sociopolitical implications. 
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If, in accordance with some variety of the traditional “oriental despotism” thesis, 
Chinese institutional hierarchies simply enshrined the dominance of wealthy political 
elites, then it is very strange why these elites would establish or tolerate property norms 
that seriously damaged their own economic interests.  Certainly they might occasionally 
compromise with lower-income groups to foster goodwill and win prestige, in much the 
same way that feudal European lords were expected to treat their subjects with some 
benevolence, but that is hardly the case here.  Instead, as discussed both above and below, 
the spirited but futile attempts of central officials and local economic elites to reign in 
“dian” redemption customs and eliminate permanent tenancy suggest not only elite 
opposition to these norms, but also an inability to abolish them. 
All this urges us to cast aside the understanding of Chinese sociolegal hierarchy 
as “oriental despotism” or the dominance of wealthy elites: the state and the wealthiest 
echelons of society simply were not that powerful.  If the concept of “Chinese” 
institutional hierarchy is to substantively survive, it must focus on the more complex 
social hierarchies within kinship groups and families.  When unpacked properly, not only 
are kinship hierarchies consistent with the relative egalitarianism of Chinese property 
norms, they actually explain it. 
Part Three: Models and Theories 
 
 Among legal historians, the traditional explanation for the customary protection 
of “dian” redemption rights in pre-industrial China has been exceedingly straightforward: 
They derived directly from a moral and ideological embracement of “permanence in 
landholding” ideals in “precommercial” societies.95  Some believe that interminable 
redemption rights were a natural normative component of premodern economies: the 
prevalence of subsistence agriculture was mutually reinforcing with mores that shamed 
the loss of ancestral property and glorified the stable descent of land from generation to 
generation.
96
  Others suggest that Chinese peasants simply possessed a strong sentimental 
attachment to land and were unwilling to lose it
97—this may have reflected, of course, the 
higher socioeconomic value of land in pre-industrial societies.  
The evidence presented in support of these arguments, however, is thin—
generally no more than vague moralizing by literati on the importance of land.  The 
higher economic value of land in preindustrial societies, on the other hand, pushed in 
opposite directions: Apart from encouraging landowners to retain their properties, it also 
encouraged them to aggressively acquire new property.  The stubbornly high demand for 
land sales, both permanent and “dian,” from around 1870 to the 1930s certainly suggests 
that the latter dynamic was consistently at work in times of relative peace,
98
 despite the 
prevalence of highly burdensome “dian” customs.  The attractiveness of landownership 
alone is, therefore, an inadequate explanation for the existence of those customs.  
Consider also the comparison with England: Early modern English landowners, too, had 
a strong sentimental and economic attachment to land, made all the more powerful by the 
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dependency of sociopolitical status on landed wealth,
99
 but this clearly did not prevent 
their customs from limiting redemption windows and tenancy security.  If anything, the 
strong psychological premium placed on landownership actually encouraged larger 
landowners to champion such limitations.   
Moreover, the characterization of early modern Chinese society as 
“precommercial” has been severely challenged in recent scholarship: Studies of grain 
price fluctuations within and across macroregions show that large portions of the rural 
economy had become market-integrated.  This directly contradicts older assumptions 
about the dominance of subsistence agriculture.  Evidence of market integration is robust 
not only in core macro-regions such as the Lower Yangtze and North China, but also in 
frontier regions such as Gansu.
100
  The Lower Yangtze, of course, boasted bustling 
commodity markets that affected a significant majority of households.  Perhaps 15 
percent of the rural workforce was completely non-agricultural, and most agricultural 
households also engaged in some textile or craft production.
101
    
Unsurprisingly, commercialization went hand-in-hand with individual economic 
rationality: most households were both calculating and resourceful.  They invested in 
land when profitable, employed excess labor in non-agricultural production, reacted 
swiftly to fluctuations in land or commodity prices, and, as demonstrated below, 
tirelessly promoted economic institutions and norms that favored their own interests.
102
  
Certainly the existence of strong lineages promoted communal solidarity, but even within 
lineages, households often clashed over property, debt, and the rules that governed 
them.
103
  It is unclear how such a commercialized society could have sustained moral 
ideals of “permanence in landholding.” 
In fact, it probably did not.  The evidence presented below strongly suggests that 
such “ideals” were embraced only by those who could economically benefit from 
them,
104
 and that “dian” and permanent tenancy customs were the result of intense and 
prolonged negotiation between highly self-interested parties, rather than simple moral 
derivatives of “precommercial” ideals.  Bargained equilibriums could emerge where 
moral uniformity did not.  As a general theoretical matter, individuals may choose to 
tolerate undesirable property norms for many reasons: to signal willingness for future 
cooperation, for example, or fear of the material and reputational costs of noncompliance. 
The assumption of basic self-interested rationality also applies easily to the 
formation and maintenance of English property customs.  Rural England was, as noted 
above, a place of considerable ruthlessness and social tension when it came to property 
acquisitions, evictions and enclosures.  Market integration had also made tremendous 
headways by the seventeenth century, as had urbanization and non-agricultural 
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production.  Correspondingly, the English population arguably became more 
“industrious,” and devoted greater attention to wealth-management.105  The problem, then, 
is why similarly self-interested bargaining over property norms in both China and 
England led to dramatically different institutional outcomes.   
This article argues that the explanation lies in how the two societies allocated 
social status and rank.  “Social status” conventionally refers to the rank of either an 
individual or a group in a social hierarchy of honor or prestige.
106
  Such hierarchies 
inevitably exist in human society, although they can be affected by a variety of factors—
physical prowess, wealth, religious or moral piety, age, and lineage, to name a few.  
Although societies vary in the relative weight they give to each specific factor,
107
 
generally, the reputational costs of contradicting a higher status person outweigh those of 
contradicting a lower status one.
108
 
This suggests a fairly straightforward model of norm negotiation: Individual 
property owners negotiate for property norms based on their perceived self-interest, but 
consider both material and reputational consequences when evaluating a particular norm.  
Both kinds of consequences, but particularly the latter, are influenced by the social status 
of allies and adversaries: all other things being equal, higher status adversaries can inflict 
stronger reputational damages, whereas higher status allies can convey stronger 
reputational rewards.  Consequently, higher status individuals more often win favorable 
institutional outcomes. 
When applied to the historical questions examined here, these deductions suggest 
the following: Because poorer households cumulatively possessed much higher social 
status in China than in England, they were able to negotiate more favorable property 
norms there.  This incorporates large doses of self-interested rationality into the analysis: 
if and when richer households conceded certain property norms to poorer ones, it was not 
because they shared in some vaguely-defined “precommercial” ideal, but because the 
social cost of a prolonged standoff was too high.   
The higher cumulative status of poorer Chinese households derived, as suggested 
above, from the “Confucian” emphasis on generational hierarchies109: The ranking of 
lineage members by generational seniority—independently, in theory, of wealth—created 
many high-status but low-income seniors.  This vastly strengthened the collective 
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bargaining power of poorer households vis-à-vis landlords and other land-accumulators, 
helping them win substantial concessions over property norms. 
In comparison, historians generally agree that, beyond a narrow class of nobility, 
kinship ties were no longer of primary socioeconomic importance for most rural 
Englishmen by the Sixteenth Century.
110
  More importantly, in the resulting 
“individualist” social order, substantial personal wealth was almost always a prerequisite 
for status and authority.
111
  Low-income households had very little representation among 
the local political elite and, short of rejecting the social order itself, had limited 
bargaining power in property norm negotiations.  They might appeal, perhaps, to social 
sympathy for the poor, but the strength of such sympathy was highly questionable in 
either country—certainly incapable of preventing widespread social tension and conflict 
over property norms.  Consequently, English property customs gave comparatively little 
protection to the economic interests of small landowners and tenants. 
This thesis does not assume self-interested rationality on all levels of decision-
making, but instead recognizes that normative internalization plays an important role in 
distributing social status.  As sociologists have long observed, norms that determine 
status distribution are frequently “inconsistent” with materialistic rankings of human 
ability, such as wealth, physical prowess, intelligence, education, or preexisting political 
power.
112
  This suggests the influence of internalized norms, often of religious or moral 
beliefs.  Unlike tenancy or land transaction norms, people are commonly exposed to 
kinship hierarchies—where they exist—from childhood, often in the form of ethical 
exhortations, thus increasing the likelihood of widespread internalization. 
Although this article takes kinship hierarchies as an independent variable, not as 
something to be further explained, it may be prudent to quickly outline why it assumes, 
as most historians have,
113
 that they were normatively internalized as a core moral 
principle by the pre-Communist Chinese population.  They had simply existed for so long, 
and on such a massive scale, that it would be shocking if no significant internalization 
had taken place.  Kinship hierarchies were a staple of Chinese social life since at least the 
wave of local lineage building around 1000 AD.
114
  By the Seventeenth Century, they 
were an indisputable cornerstone of local social organization in “core” macroregions.115  
Not coincidentally, local lineage building correlated with the rise of Song and Ming Neo-
Confucianism, which systematized the legal and social enforcement of kinship 
hierarchies with unprecedented metaphysical rigor.
116
  Correspondingly, one finds, in 
every era, an overwhelming amount of writing, including political documents, 
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philosophical treatises, and lineage registries, that proclaimed embeddedness within 
kinship hierarchies as “the natural way of heaven.”117 
Moral internalization coexisted, of course, with a variety of functionalist factors: 
With some exceptions, most Song, Ming and Qing governments promoted lineage 
building as a cost-effective way to establish local order and decentralize the political 
elite.
118
  Government sponsorship contributed, therefore, to the popularity of Confucian 
kinship hierarchies, as did the many socioeconomic functions that kinship networks 
performed, including dispute resolution, crime prevention, poor relief, and education.
119
   
On the other hand, these functionalist factors cannot fully explain the consistent 
popularity of kinship organizations throughout a millennium of radical political and 
socioeconomic change: Government attitudes towards lineages were not always friendly, 
particularly during the Ming and mid-Qing.
120
  Social organization and welfare functions, 
on the other hand, were not the exclusive domain of kinship networks, but were also 
provided by religious organizations.
121
  There was no necessary correlation between the 
supply of these functions and the embracement of generational hierarchies.  
In recognizing the importance of normative internalization in norm creation and 
maintenance, the model constructed here bears some resemblance to the “precommercial 
ideals” thesis.  There are, however, enormous differences of degree.  The model here 
argues for striking the right balance between normative internalization and self-interested 
negotiation.  Property norms themselves, as demonstrated both above and below, were 
economically sensitive and malleable.  Operating in close proximity to people’s core 
economic interests, particularly in early modern societies, they easily inspired 
considerations of material self-interest and, therefore, tended to reflect equilibrium 
outcomes of self-interested negotiation.  On the other hand, self-interested negotiation 
itself followed certain social rules of conduct, and could be affected particularly strongly 
by norms that determine status and authority distribution.  The problem, then, with the 
“precommercial ideals” thesis is that it jumps too early into cultural internalization, 
leaving no room for self-interested rationality. 
Part Four: Empirics 
 
 This part provides empirical support for the model put forth in Part Three, broken 
down into three sub-arguments:  First, “dian” redemption customs were the source of 
widespread social tension and negotiation.  They were therefore far more likely the 
equilibrium outcome of self-interested negotiation than the institutional manifestation of 
“precommercial” morality.  Second, the prevalence of kinship hierarchies allowed lower-
income households to regularly occupy positions of considerable sociopolitical authority 
and dignity.  Third, kinship hierarchies and corresponding status distribution patterns 
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played a significant role in shaping the content and enforceability of “dian” redemption 
norms.  Section Four discusses comparable patterns and trends in English sociolegal 
history.   
 Section One: Conflict and Negotiation 
 
 The clearest indication that “dian” redemption customs were never fully 
internalized by Qing society is the sheer volume of litigation that they caused.  This is 
best illustrated by statistics drawn from available local case archives.  Within North 
China and the Lower Yangtze, there are two of these, one at Baodi County, Hebei 
Province, the other at Longquan County, Zhejiang Province.  Only the latter is well 
preserved enough to project a reasonably solid statistical overview.  It holds 18434 cases 
from 1910 to 1949, including 10614 civil suits and 7820 criminal cases.
122
   Accounting 
for the loss of case files over time, the average number of civil cases per year probably 
ranged from 300 to 600—in a county of roughly 20,000 households—consistent with 
preexisting estimates of late Qing and Republican county-level caseloads.
123
  Within the 
10614 civil suits, 430 stemmed from a dispute concerning “dian” sales, of which 386 
focused on whether the “dian” seller should be allowed to redeem.124  Assuming a 
representative sample—there is no reason not to, this suggests that 4 to 5 percent of civil 
disputes were “dian” related, with around 85 percent of those related directly to 
redemption disputes.  “Dian” redemption disputes were, therefore, one of the most 
significant sources of civil litigation.  Of course, it seems unlikely that more than a 
fraction of contractual disputes ended up in court, which suggests that there may have 
been a hundred or more of these disputes in the county each year.   
 A more difficult question is how many “dian” redemption cases involved claims 
by the “dian” buyer that too much time had passed since the original contract for 
redemption to be allowable.  Because access to the full case archive remains limited, this 
article relies on a randomly selected sample of sample of 80 “dian” cases, of which 65 
were related specifically to “dian” redemption.125  26 of these featured express claims that 
the “dian” seller’s redemption rights had expired after a certain period of time.126  This 
was the single most common rationale relied upon by “dian” buyers to reject redemption 
efforts. 
 Although precise projection is dangerous, these numbers do at least demonstrate 
that “dian” redemption deadlines, or the lack thereof, were in fact a frequently contested 
issue.  Of the 26 “dian” expiration cases, 16 involved contracts that had been made more 
than 30 years prior to the redemption attempt, the oldest of which was made 72 years 
prior.
127
  In at least 5 of these 16, the “dian” buyer expressly cited a 1917 provincial 
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regulation that banned redemption of “dian” contracts after 30 years.128  “Dian” sellers 
avoided, naturally, any mention of this regulation.  It should surprise no one that the 
parties’ normative preferences dovetailed perfectly with their perceived economic 
interests: “Dian” sellers preferred the customary norms of unlimited redemption, whereas 
“dian” buyers petitioned the court to override those norms. 
 The local court’s response was, unsurprisingly, tepid and incoherent.  In only one 
of the 16 cases did it enforce the 30-year deadline against the “dian” seller.129  One other 
redemption attempt was rejected because the seller repeatedly failed to show in court.
130
  
In three other cases, the court allowed redemption despite the passage of 38, 50, and 59 
years.
131
  The remaining 11 cases were settled.  Such erratic adjudicatory behavior did 
little damage to the reach and authority of local custom.  
 In addition, there is some qualitative evidence in these cases that “dian” buyers 
were generally far wealthier than “dian” sellers.  Several “dian” sellers described their 
own economic circumstances as “poor,” “tight,” and “in shambles,” while referring to the 
“dian” buyers as among “the wealthiest households” in the village.132  While this may 
simply have been rhetoric flourish, the fact that the “dian” buyers in question never 
contradicted these descriptions, despite their otherwise ruthless ad hominem attacks on 
the “dian” sellers, lends them a fair dose of credibility. 
 The substantive composition of “dian” disputes brought before Qing county 
courts elsewhere did not seem to differ significantly from the Republican-era patterns 
observed in Longquan.  In, for example, a sample of 26 “dian”-related cases randomly 
drawn from the better-known Baodi, Baxian and Danxin archives—geographically 
covering North China, the Sichuan basin, and Taiwan, whether redemption rights expired 
after a certain number of years was the main point of contention in 9 cases, outnumbering 
all other causes of dispute.
133
  The time span between initial transaction and attempted 
redemption in these cases ranged from 11 years to 77, all beyond the 10-year deadline set 
by the Board of Finance.  All 9 cases were eventually resolved out-of-court, generally 
under terms quite favorable to the “dian” seller. 
A much larger spate of “dian” disputes can be found in three private case 
collections from the Lower Yangtze, covering the years 1875-1908.
134
  Combined, they 
yield 1063 local civil disputes, including 96 “dian”-related cases, 59 of which involved a 
dispute over redemption.
135
  34 of the 59 focused specifically on whether redemption 
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rights could expire.
136
  These ratios are similar to what we found in Baodi, Baxian, 
Danxin, or Longquan, clearly indicating that “dian” redemption deadlines were a 
significant source of social tension throughout the late Qing and Republic. 
 Widespread social tension over “dian” redemption deadlines also surfaces in a 
variety of Republican-era social surveys.  The most detailed of these are Japanese surveys 
of rural North China conducted around 1940, otherwise known as the “Mantetsu 
surveys.”137  Focusing primarily on six villages in Hebei and Shandong, they contain 
several hundred interviews with villagers on local governance, customary law, and other 
aspects of social organization.  Naturally, general trends observed across the entire survey 
are more reliable than specific information drawn from individual interviewees. 
One particularly striking trend is the extent to which interviewees from different 
economic backgrounds quarreled over property norms.  In the two most extensively 
surveyed villages, Sibeichai and Shajing, researchers asked over twenty villagers about 
what they thought were the customs that governed “dian” transactions.138  In Sibeichai, 
all interviewees agreed that “dian” redemption had no deadline,139 but at least one local 
landlord complained that it was an “archaic” custom.140  On several other issues, the 
landlords clashed openly with poorer village leaders over what the customs really were: 
One former village chief of middling wealth argued that “dian” sales could be redeemed 
even before the “guaranteed usage period” had expired, and even if the “dian” seller 
owed additional debt to the “dian” buyer.141  Several others concurred.142  Landlords and 
wealthier farmers disagreed: “Dian” buyers could deny redemption if the “dian” seller 
owed any outstanding debt, or if the guaranteed usage period had yet to expire.
143
 
 In Shajing, social discord existed not only over these comparatively minor issues, 
but also over whether “dian” redemption rights truly were interminable.  Most 
interviewees stated that local custom allowed redemption regardless of time passage 
since the initial contract,
144
 but one person, unsurprisingly one of the largest landowners 
in the village, declared that the true governing principle was the thirty-year redemption 
deadline enacted by the 1929 Republican Civil Code.
145
  According to a poorer 
interviewee, however, the rule was generally unenforceable in practice.
146
 
 Three other villages, Lengshuizhuang, Houxiazhai, and Wudian, resembled 
Sibeichai more than Shajing, in that all interviewees affirmed the basic principle of 
interminable redemption rights, but argued vigorously over more technical rules—for 
example, whether guaranteed usage periods were enforceable.
147
  At Houjiaying, 
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however, one interviewee declared that “although the traditional rule was that redemption 
could take place at any time, now it must be done within thirty years.”148   This was a 
once-wealthy store owner who possessed some real estate that his deceased brother had 
“dian” purchased years ago from poorer neighbors, relying upon it to maintain a decent 
standard-of-living.
149
  It is hardly surprising, then, that he both knew of the thirty-year 
redemption law and attempted to take advantage.  Other interviewees who were, in fact, 
“dian” sellers disagreed in strong terms.150 
 The picture that emerges from this array of sources, both cases and interviews, is 
one of tension and dispute over customary norms, but not of social chaos in which no 
operative norm existed.  Despite the large array of cases that involved the “dian” buyer 
arguing that redemption rights expired after either ten or thirty years, an equally eye-
catching trend is that, when the great majority of these cases were resolved out-of-court, 
these same people almost always agreed to terms quite favorable to the “dian” seller, at 
least in cases that report the settlement terms.  Most often, after further negotiation 
between senior relatives from both sides, they would simply allow the “dian” seller to 
redeem.
151
  In the other cases, they retained possession of the land, but only after giving 
the seller an additional payment, and often without receiving any promise that 
redemption was henceforth prohibited.
152
  This casts into doubt the strength of their 
resolve against these “archaic” customs.  Their behavior is that of a practical “forum 
shopper” who attempts to take advantage of the more accommodating property norms 
provided by the central government, but retreats once the odds worsen and social pressure 
intensifies.  The resigned complaints of the frustrated Sibeichai landlord provide further 
support for this interpretation.
153
  Even in Shajing and Houjiaying, the few interviewees 
who proposed overriding traditional custom with legal regulations nonetheless 
recognized that those customs did provide for unlimited “dian” redemption.154  
There is, therefore, strong historical evidence that local communities regulated 
“dian” transactions via customary law, but also that these customs were the source of 
much social contention.  In all likelihood, they were created via negotiation between self-
interested and, insofar as their preferred norms correlated to their perceived economic 
self-interest, basically rational parties.  Strikingly, the wealthiest segments of rural 
communities frequently felt powerless against their poorer neighbors, and had to tolerate 
property norms that substantially damaged their socioeconomic interests. 
Section Two: Patterns of Status Distribution 
 
This section measures the relative effects of kinship and wealth on status 
distribution.  It turns first to the Mantetsu surveys, which yield detailed demographic and 
landholding data for all surveyed villages.  The interviews identify 126 political elites 
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across seven villages, current and former, who can be matched with landownership and 
kinship information.
155
  These included village chiefs and their deputies, major lineage 
chiefs, and “jiazhang” (“ten-household chiefs”) or equivalent.  Not included in this 
sample are people whose landholding information is unavailable.   
Quite contrary to what previous—and far less statistically thorough—studies of 
the Mantetsu surveys have suggested, lower-income households were proportionally 
represented among the village political elite.  63 of the 128 owned less land than the 
village median.
156
  Nor were all 63 concentrated in “lower-tier” positions—“jiazhang” 
(head of a village subdivision) rather than village chief, for example.  Of the 32 people 
identified to have been village chief during the past decade, 14 owned less land per-capita 
than the village average.
157
  Of the 35 largest landowners from the seven villages, only 9 
had wielded any formal political authority in recent years.
158
  This was, of course, still a 
considerably higher ratio than among lower-income households, but nonetheless low 
enough to suggest that landed wealth was a weak determinant of sociopolitical authority. 
On the other hand, the correlation between sociopolitical authority and 
generational seniority was extremely strong.  At least 108 of the 128 individuals belonged 
to the most senior generation of what villagers identified as a “major kinship group.”159  
Only 9 people clearly belonged to a younger generation, whereas the generational 
standing of the other 11 are unclear.
160
  This suggests that well over 90 percent of village 
political elites belonged to the senior generation of a major kinship group. 
The above analysis assumes that political leadership positions were generally 
objects of social desire, and therefore fairly accurate proxies for high status and authority.  
But was this true?  Based also on the Mantetsu surveys, Prasenjit Duara has argued that 
the richest North China households actually avoided assuming direct political authority, 
considering it burdensome and risky.
161
  The sole piece of evidence for these claims is an 
interview with Du Fengshan, a Lengshuizhuang village chief who had served for over 
two decades despite owning almost no land.  Du notes that the village had undergone a 
political reorganization after 1935, in which 14 lüzhang (a jiazhang equivalent) replaced 
the 8 shoushi (“chief administrators”) who had previously handled basic administration.  
He then lists from memory the names and landholdings of all 22 men.
162
  There was, as 
Duara points out, no overlap between the two administrations.  Moreover, Du reports 
notably higher landholding figures for the 8 shoushi than for the 14 lüzhang.  Duara 
argues, therefore, that the village economic elite, as represented by the 8 shoushi, had 
consciously withdrawn from political leadership positions.
163
 
However, Du’s recollection is extraordinarily unreliable: no other interviewee 
ever mentions the 8 shoushi he lists, and only one of them can be found on the village 
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land registry.
164
  Moreover, that one person actually owned only 2 mu, not the 20 mu that 
Du reported.
165
  Du’s list of the 14 lüzhang was likewise inaccurate.  He misstates the 
names of 4 people, and provides wildly inaccurate landholding numbers for another 5.
166
  
Whether Du was consciously misleading the Japanese researchers is unclear—his 
advanced age may have impaired his memory.  Moreover, although there was no overlap 
between the 14 lüzhang and the 8 shoushi that immediately preceded them, one lüzhang 
had, in fact, been part of an earlier class of shoushi.
167
  The two classes of shoushi also 
shared only one common member, suggesting that the large volume of personnel turnover 
was traditionally normal.  There is simply no reliable evidence that Lengshuizhuang 
economic elites “withdrew” from village politics.  Quite the opposite, some had 
considerable political aspirations, even in 1940: According to one interviewee, the 
village’s largest landowner could not obtain his desired sociopolitical status “because he 
[was] only in his twenties.”168   
The conclusions drawn here stand in distinct opposition to two previous studies of 
the Mantetsu surveys: Duara’s, of course, but also Philip Huang’s important study of the 
North China economy.  Both suggest that, quoting Huang, “lineage leaders and village 
‘councilmen’ were generally also the village rich.”169  They rely, however, on highly 
incomplete surveys of village elite: Huang relies on a sample of 18 people;
170
 while 
Duara provides only incomplete lists from Shajing, Houjiaying, and Lengshuizhuang.
171
  
More comprehensive coverage demonstrates, however, that lower-income households 
were hardly underrepresented among the political elite. 
Certain regions of North China were, of course, more economically stratified than 
others.  Joseph Esherick and Kenneth Pomeranz have noted, for example, that resident 
landlordism was more prevalent in the southwestern edge of Shandong Province than in 
other regions of North China, with large landlords owning perhaps a third or more of all 
arable land.
172
  Whether this meant that they dominated local social and political 
authority, however, is ambiguous.  The main sociopolitical function they controlled were 
organizing and funding local militias—something only the rich could provide.173  
Otherwise, there is no clear evidence that the ranks of local political elite were forcibly 
monopolized by higher-income households.  Southwestern Shandong villages were 
highly consolidated, demographically stable, and resistant to government intervention,
174
 
but this suggests cooperation between rich and poor as much as stratified dominance. 
Social organization in the Lower Yangtze was different in several aspects, but 
nonetheless similar in that it revolved around large kinship networks.  Unlike North 
China kinship groups, which owned almost no common property, a small but notable 
fraction of arable land in the Lower Yangtze was owned not by individual households, 
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but by lineages (“zongzu”)—commonly understood as kinship groups that collectively 
owned some property, under arrangements quite similar to modern corporate holdings.
175
  
Compared to North China kinship groups, these lineages were better organized and more 
populous.
176
  Whereas the average North China village might possess several kinship 
groups, each consisting of a few dozen households, Lower Yangtze villages were very 
often dominated by one large lineage, operating under published regulations and detailed 
conduct codes.  Political authority and status in geographical communities were therefore 
inseparable from authority and status within lineages.  But how did lineages allocate 
status? 
We focus here on the considerable number of lineage registries that were 
produced throughout the Qing and early Republic.  Apart from recording the family tree, 
they also contained significant information on the use and maintenance of common 
property, rules of personal conduct, and rules on the selection of lineage heads and 
councilors.  The collection of twelve registries analyzed here all hail from the Ningbo, 
Shicang and Longquan regions of Zhejiang Province, each correlating to a large lineage 
that dominated at least one village between 1870 and 1930.
177
 
These lineages shared two basic organizational characteristics.  First, none of the 
registries positively identify personal wealth with higher internal status and authority.  At 
least three, in fact, expressly condemned as immoral the allocation of status based on 
material affluence.  The natural order of families was, they stated, one that gave senior 
members precedence over junior ones, and any corruption of this principle by 
materialistic concerns was intolerable.
178
  Second, of the seven lineages that published 
selection criteria for leadership positions, all seven highlight the importance of 
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generational seniority.
179
  The Jiang lineage of Ningbo, for example, divided its members 
into five subgroups, each of which sent the eldest member of the highest generation to the 
lineage council.
180
  This five-person council arbitrated all internal disputes, represented 
the lineage in external negotiations, managed common property, coordinated labor and 
resource sharing, and enforced lineage regulations.  In this latter task, the council could 
often count on the county government’s backing, to the point where “bringing offenders 
to the county court” was listed as the punishment of last resort.181 
Among members of the same generation, one lineage in our sample chose to rank 
individuals not by age, but by lineal proximity to a descent line of firstborn males 
extending back to the founding ancestor: his eldest son, the eldest son’s eldest son, and so 
on.
182
  This line of eldest sons (“zongzi”) enjoyed higher status than other members of 
their generation, regardless of age.  All other members were ranked by their lineal 
proximity to him: his brothers would, for example, have social precedence over his 
cousins, usually through more prominent roles in ancestor worship rituals and easier 
access to lineage leadership positions.  In some lineages, although none in our sample, 
the “zongzi” could succeed his father as lineage head even if some of the father’s 
generation still lived, although in such cases he shared authority with councilors from the 
higher generation.
183
  For the purposes of this article, these systems are not fundamentally 
different from straightforward ranking by seniority, in that they rank lineage members 
according to criteria that have little discernible correlation to wealth.  Previous 
scholarship on Lower Yangtze lineages suggest, in any case, that straightforward ranking 
by generation and age gradually replaced “zongzi” systems during the Ming and Qing.184  
Intelligence and possession of official degrees—extremely rare in the Qing185—were also 
important considerations, but wealth per se did not obviously matter.
186
   
Lower Yangtze lineages were, in this regard, noticeably different from lineages in 
South China.  In Fujian Province, scholars have identified three major structural 
categories: “inheritance lineages,” which, like the Lower Yangtze lineages described 
above, assigned leadership positions strictly based on generational seniority; “control-
subordination” lineages, where wealthier households expressly dominated poorer ones; 
and “contractual lineages,” usually creations of convenience where various non-related 
households banded together due to shared economic interests, and where leadership 
selection was less organized.
187
  “Inheritance lineages” were still predominant in the late-
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Qing,
188
 but as corporate landholding expanded, the need for efficient management 
occasionally concentrated authority into the hands of the most economically capable—
usually the wealthiest—households, creating a “control-subordination” lineage.189   
The major difference between South China and the Lower Yangtze was, however, 
precisely the amount of corporate land owned by lineages.  Previous estimates of lineage 
property show that, apart from South China, where it exceeded 35 percent of total arable 
land, lineage landholding was trivial elsewhere.
190
  The economic rationales and 
conditions that sometimes transformed “inheritance lineages” into less egalitarian forms 
were therefore abundant in South China, but largely absent in the Lower Yangtze. 
The existence of “control-subordination” and “contractual” lineages in South 
China demonstrates that normative appeal of Confucian kinship ideals was not immune 
from erosion by economic factors.  It does not, however, imply that such ideals were in 
widespread jeopardy.  It would otherwise be difficult to explain the predominance, in 
both North China and the Lower Yangtze, of kinship groups that adhered closely to them, 
or even the smaller majority of “inheritance lineages” in South China. 
Section Three: Kinship Hierarchies and Property Norms 
 
The previous two sections have demonstrated that “dian” customs were the 
product of self-interested negotiation, and that local status distribution correlated far 
better with “Confucian” kinship hierarchies than with wealth distribution.  It remains to 
show to show that the relatively egalitarian distribution of status and rank facilitated by 
these kinship hierarchies affected norm negotiation and enforcement in ways that favored 
seller-friendly “dian” customs. 
This is relatively straightforward for North China, where the Mantetsu surveys 
provide numerous insights on the roles of village political elites in norm negotiation.  
First and foremost, village leaders of middling or lower wealth were often quite 
aggressive in protecting these customs against attempted erosion by landlords.  The 
clearest example of this is when Zhang Leqing, former village chief of Sibeichai and 
middling landowner, engaged in a prolonged battle with local landlord Lin Fengxi over 
the proper procedure for “dian” redemption.191  Zhang argued, internally and to county 
investigators, that his redemption of a “dian” sale from Lin was only dependent upon 
repayment of the initial “dian” price.192  He had later accrued additional debt to Lin, but 
that was unrelated and immaterial.  Lin countered that, because he had allowed Zhang to 
remain on the “dian”-sold property as a rent-paying tenant, and because the additional 
debt was actually several years of unpaid rent, it was too closely tied to the initial “dian” 
transaction for Zhang to redeem without full repayment of all outstanding rent.
193
  This 
was, to Lin, what local custom “should” have been.   
Several local landlords voiced their support for Lin,
194
 but other lower-income 
village elites sided with Zhang.
195
  By the time of the interview, the dispute was still 
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ongoing, but Zhang was confident that his view would prevail.
196
  Lin, meanwhile, 
seemed resigned that he would be unable to recuperate the outstanding rent before Zhang 
redeemed, complaining that he could not fight the “stubborn” villagers who stuck to their 
“backwards customs.”197 
Although most disputes over “dian” customs in the surveyed villages were 
relatively narrow and technical, similar to the Zhang Leqing-Lin Fengxi dispute, they 
could sometimes trigger broader debates among village leaders about the expiration of 
“dian” redemption rights.  As discussed above, a few wealthy interviewees suggested 
superseding traditional customs with national regulations that banned redemption after 
thirty years.
198
  Naturally, lower-income interviewees rejected this out-of-hand.
199
   
Many of these lower-income individuals were, in fact, members of the village 
political elite.  For example, Li Liangfu, a Lengshuizhuang village official of middling 
wealth, seemed to know of the thirty-year legal deadline, but rejected outright any notion 
that it should be enforceable in his village.  Similar statements were made by Zhao 
Shaoting, village councilor of Shajing, Hou Dingyi, former village chief of Houjiaying, 
and Hou Ruihe, also a member of Houjiaying’s village administration.200  Zhang and Hou 
Ruihe were both below-average landholders, whereas Hou Dingyi was slightly above-
average in terms of overall household landholding, but probably below average on a per-
capita basis due to the unusually large size of his household.
201
  In the three other 
surveyed villages, the thirty-year redemption deadline was never openly discussed, but 
researchers nonetheless encountered middling or low-income village leaders who 
expressed preferences for “dian” customs that would allow “dian” sellers to, for example, 
redeem even before the guaranteed-usage period had expired, or reject any right-of-first-
purchase claim made by “dian” buyers.202   
Another notable observation is that the only two villages, Shajing and 
Houjiaying,
203
 where some interviewees expressly argued—if unsuccessfully—that “dian” 
redemption rights should expire beyond a certain deadline also happened to be the only 
two villages where large landlords appeared to enjoy some noticeable political 
advantage
204: In Shajing, 5 of the top 8 village leaders (“huishou”), including the only 
identifiable village chief, owned significantly more land per-capita than the village 
average.  In fact, 4 of them, including the village chief, owned more than twice as much.  
In Houjiaying, 8 of 10 identifiable current and former village chiefs were above average 
landholders, including 5 people who owned at least three times the average amount, 2 of 
whom were among the village’s top 5 landholders.  Additionally, 3 of 5 identifiable vice 
village chiefs were above-average landholders.  In no other surveyed village do above-
average landholders account for more than half of identifiable village chiefs, vice-village 
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chiefs, or “huishou”/“baozhang”-level205 officials.  Of course, even in Shajing and 
Houjiaying, lower-income households still occupied most of the lower-ranked political 
positions, but larger landholders did seem to enjoy a substantial edge in obtaining the top 
positions.  While this may be pure coincidence—that possibility is hard to rule out in a 
sample of only seven villages—one reasonable interpretation is that the customary right 
of unlimited “dian” redemption was more secure in villages where large landholders were 
politically weaker. 
All this suggests, ultimately, that vigorous support from lower-income political 
elites was quite instrumental in sustaining and enforcing seller-friendly “dian” norms.  
Their support could take effect in a variety of ways: As many interviewees attested, 
village officials usually played crucial roles in mediating and settling “dian” and 
permanent sale related disputes, and therefore had numerous opportunities in everyday 
economic life to encourage and perhaps enforce adherence to their preferred institutional 
norms.
206
  The Zhang Leqing-Lin Fengxi dispute also highlights the somewhat higher-
level forums, including formal litigation and village-wide “policy” debates, in which 
advocacy and support by sympathetic political elites could be particularly effective at 
reinforcing customary property institutions. 
The Lower Yangtze poses greater empirical challenges.  There are few sources 
there, if any, that directly document the positions of village or lineage elites in “dian”-
related disputes—certainly nothing comparable to the Mantetsu surveys.  Fortunately, 
there is much circumstantial evidence to be found, from both the county case archives 
discussed above and several major collections of land contracts from the same periods. 
Whether in North China or the Lower Yangtze, few potential “dian” buyers and 
sellers negotiated contracts themselves.  Rather, one side would typically ask a 
middleman to contact the other side, gather both sides’ preferences, propose a reasonable 
compromise, measure the land, and, finally, draw up the deed.  If any disputes flared up 
after the contract signing, the middleman would likewise supervise initial mediation and 
renegotiation attempts.
207
  Given these expansive duties, he needed to command enough 
trust and respect within the community to effectively broker deals and settle disputes.   
The argument here is that the great majority of Lower Yangtze middlemen were 
relatively senior members of either the “dian” seller’s or the “dian” buyer’s kinship group.  
These were usually identical, as most people preferred to do business with relatives.  In 
any case, the near-omnipresence of senior kinsmen in “dian” sales strongly suggests that 
kinship groups were heavily involved with the negotiation and enforcement of proper 
behavior in these transactions.  
 These claims rely on data culled from two recently discovered contract collections 
in Zhejiang.  The first is a set of 415 late-Qing land contracts from the Ningbo region, of 
which 412 were “dian” sales contracts, redemption contracts, or conversions from “dian” 
to permanent conveyance.
208
  All 415 identify not only the names of middlemen, but also 
their kinship affinity, if any, with either contracting party—usually the seller.  403 
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contracts employed at least one elder relative as middleman.
209
  Moreover, of the 389 
transactions made between members of the same lineage, 385 employed only fellow 
lineage members as middlemen.
210
  The most sought-after middlemen were generally 
senior members of one’s lineage,211 brokering contracts for nephews or junior cousins.  
There is no indication that personal wealth enhanced one’s perceived fitness to be 
middleman—many, even the most popular, were themselves indebted “dian” sellers.212 
 The second contract collection is a batch of 140 land sales from Shicang Village, 
Songyang County, spanning the years 1865 to 1915.
213
  108 of these, or 77 percent, were 
“dian” transactions.  The social composition of middlemen in these contracts was almost 
identical to the Ningbo collection: 130 of the 140 land sales, and 103 of 108 “dian” 
transactions, involved at least one middleman who was an elder relative of one 
contracting party, and the great majority involved at least three.
214
  Here, too, certain 
senior members of the locally dominant lineage were in high demand.
215
 
These empirical patterns highlight the influence that senior lineage members 
exerted on land transactions and their underlying social norms.  Most importantly, 
middlemen were also mediators and arbitrators of first-resort in case of dispute, and 
therefore exercised considerable authority over the contracting parties.  Employing senior 
relatives as middlemen further strengthened such authority and gave them a legitimate 
opportunity to advocate and enforce their understanding of local property norms.  From 
there, it is but a small step to suggest that, because these senior relatives were often 
themselves low-income “dian” sellers, their wide-ranging influence over transactions 
weakened the ability of higher-income households to obtain their preferred normative and 
contractual outcomes.   
One would also expect that this weakening effect was particularly strong in intra-
lineage “dian” sales, as the influence of middlemen should have been significantly 
stronger when they were related to both parties.  On the other hand, middlemen who were 
unrelated to either side possessed comparatively less authority, as the reputational costs 
of ignoring or contradicting them were significantly lower.  This increased the potential 
for extended conflict and ruthless bargaining tactics in inter-lineage transactions.  For 
example, inter-lineage sales accounted for a strong majority of “dian” disputes in the 
Lower Yangtze county cases discussed in Section One,
216
 even though they probably 
accounted for only a small fraction of all “dian” sales.217  Therefore, if kinship hierarchies 
affected the negotiation and enforcement of “dian” customs in favor of lower-income 
households, their effect should have been greater in cases where buyer and seller 
belonged to the same lineage. 
This is precisely what we find in these county-level cases.
218
  In one 1896 case 
from Zhuji County, a relatively junior member of the local Zhou lineage attempted to ban 
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a cousin-in-law from redeeming land her husband had conveyed to him five years ago.
219
  
The point of contention was whether the conveyance was a “dian” sale—here termed a 
“ya” transaction—or a permanent one.  After consulting with other community members, 
the magistrate decided that the debate was immaterial: “[A]t the time of the transaction, 
the parties clearly should have understood that, because they were relatives, not only was 
a “dian” sale certainly redeemable, but there was also no reason why a permanent sale 
would not be. . . . In any case, [the defendant] is [the plaintiff’s] senior cousin-in-law . . ., 
so why does he not treat her according to reason and moral responsibility?”220  This was 
no isolated incident: similar decisions appear in at least three other cases.
221
   
The magistrate cites no clear authority for this extraordinary claim, but unless we 
assume incredible ignorance of central laws and regulations, he was probably aware that 
it violated every formal legal authority possible.
222
  Moreover, it seems implausible that 
he believed that this was some universal moral commandment—the steps he took to 
reach the conclusion, including meeting with community members, indicate that he was 
persuaded of its applicability under certain circumstances, not that he came in with a-
priori moral faith in it.  This strongly suggests that the claim derived from his 
understanding of local customary practices. 
He was not alone in this observation.  It also appears in three cases decided by 
another Lower Yangtze magistrate from the same era, who commented that, because 
“dian” buyers were expected to show greater leniency for low-income kinsmen, 
permanent sales between kinsmen were redeemable.
223
  The vast majority of “dian” 
sellers would probably have appreciated this extra concession, especially if, as argued 
above, the selling of property was usually a last resort in times of extraordinary financial 
need.  All this suggests, as argued above, that middlemen were often sympathetic towards 
the economic interests of lower-income relatives, and could act upon that sympathy more 
strongly in cases where the transacting parties were kinsmen. 
 Section Four: English Comparisons 
 
 Ultimately, there is much evidence, from both North China and the Lower 
Yangtze, that the relatively egalitarian status-distribution patterns within kinship 
hierarchies affected norm negotiation and enforcement in ways that promoted seller-
friendly “dian” customs.  But does the prevalence of kinship hierarchies in China—and 
the lack thereof in England—also explain the institutional divergence between Chinese 
and English property customs?  This article argues, of course, that they do.  This again 
relies on three sub-arguments: First, English property norms, like Chinese ones, were 
largely the product of self-interested maneuvering and negotiation.  Their comparatively 
weaker protection of lower-income households reflected, therefore, the weaker 
bargaining position of those households.  Second, substantial landed wealth was 
generally a prerequisite for high social status and political leadership in rural England, 
allowing large landowners to monopolize positions of power.  Third, kinship networks 
were far less expansive and influential in England than in China and, consequently, were 
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of marginal significance in status distribution and norm negotiation.  Ultimately, the 
reach and influence of “Confucian” kinship hierarchies in China was indeed a distinct 
factor that substantially explains the Sino-English divergence in property regulation. 
 Preexisting scholarship provides largely consensual support for all three sub-
arguments.  As discussed above, studies of early modern English land norms have 
highlighted the aggressive, even ruthless, manner in which large landlords attempted to 
reshape property norms in their favor.
224
  Especially in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Centuries, the 
wide array of unilateral enclosures, evictions, rent and fee manipulation, and default 
seizures that wealthy households employed to accumulate and consolidate land clashed 
intensely with what lower-income households considered normatively appropriate.
225
  
Even after 1700, when enclosures had become less controversial, issues such as gleaning 
rights remained highly contentious between higher and lower income households.
226
  
Scholars therefore regularly portray the process of norm creation as one negotiated by 
highly self-interested parties, often with a shade of class-conflict.
227
 
 The striking thing about English property norms is not merely that they treated 
lower-income households less leniently than Chinese norms, but also that they became 
progressively less lenient over time: The normative position of small tenants, for example, 
deteriorated quite severely during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Centuries as large landowners hacked 
away at traditional customs that protected copyholders and leaseholders.
228
   
Mortgage laws and customs underwent a similar transformation.  During the 12
th
 
and 13
th
 Centuries, it was still possible to establish “living gages” (vivum vadium)—an 
archaic predecessor to mortgages—in which the debtor did not face any fixed deadline to 
redeem.
229
  Rather, the creditor would assume possession of the collateralized land, and 
whatever produce it generated would count towards the initial debt, along with any 
repayment the debtor might make.  By the 15
th
 Century, this relatively debtor-friendly 
instrument had fallen into disuse, replaced almost completely by “mortgages” that 
required repayment within a fixed term.
230
  On the bright side, many local customs still 
guaranteed the defaulting debtor a foreclosure sale, so that he might at least recoup the 
full market value of the collateral.
231
  The deterioration of the debtor’s institutional 
position accelerated, however, during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Century: First, an increasing 
number of local customs cut down on repayment windows, to the point where mortgage 
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contracts generally demanded redemption within a year of the original transaction.
232
  
Second, the foreclosure sale was gradually replaced, both normatively and in practice, by 
automatic full conveyance to the creditor upon default, even if the initial mortgage sum 
fell far short of the land’s full value.233  Clearly, property norms leaned increasingly 
towards wealthy, land-accumulating, households. 
This brings us to point two.  Even during the 16
th
 Century, when wealth disparity 
was not nearly as severe as in the 18
th
 Century, large English landowners enjoyed one 
distinct advantage over their Chinese peers: they possessed a near-monopoly on formal 
sociopolitical authority within local communities.  Surveys of English localities during 
the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Centuries have repeatedly shown that recognition as a “gentleman” and 
the assumption of political responsibility were almost universally dependent upon the 
possession of substantial landed wealth.
234
  Scholars have traditionally argued, in fact, 
that higher levels of landownership directly “dictated” higher social and political 
status.
235
  More recent studies have tempered this argument, demonstrating that other 
factors, including a consistent commitment to public service or long-term residency in the 
community, were comparably important.
236
  On the other hand, they continue to 
emphasize that significant landed wealth was at least a prerequisite for high status and, 
moreover, that other factors displayed considerable correlation with wealth: Because 
larger landowners generally had more settled residency patterns and stronger records of 
public service, the effects of these various factors were often conflated.
237
  In any case, a 
sociopolitical situation like that in Sibeichai, where most village leaders were actually 
below-average landholders, would have been unthinkable. 
Why larger English landowners enjoyed this monopoly has no simple explanation.  
To some extent, it was buttressed by sociopolitical reorganization after the Black Death, 
in which the “the upper orders of English society drew together into a more cohesive 
government” to combat the social disorder created by the death of perhaps half the 
country’s population.238  The large expansion in state power weakened, on the one hand, 
hereditary hierarchies between lords and subjects, but, on the other, because the state 
delegated local authority exclusively to the landed classes, it also excluded lower-income 
households more completely from positions of power.  On the other hand, significant 
wealth-based stratification certainly predated the Black Death.
239
  Moreover, the 
monopolization of political authority by the landed classes was generally discussed in 
highly didactic terms—for example, the nobility and gentry were referred to by 
influential clergyman William Harrison as “those whome their race and blood or at least 
their vertues doo make noble and knowne”—that suggested at least some moral 
internalization.
240
  Most likely, moral internalization and state promotion went hand in 
hand.  In any case, the status dominance of higher-income classes predated widespread 
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landlord encroachment upon traditional customary property rights by over a century, and 
was almost certainly an important precondition. 
There remains, for the sake of logical completeness, the issue of whether kinship 
networks influenced status distribution in England.  In short: not significantly.  While 
Alan Macfarlane’s controversial work on “English individualism” is probably the first 
item that comes to mind on this,
241
 later scholarship confirms his basic findings with 
better evidence and more systematic analysis: that individual landowners were generally 
free to buy, sell or mortgage land without substantial interference from their kinship 
groups or traditional feudal hierarchies of landownership.
242
  Many, perhaps most, 
landowners preferred to keep their property within the family if possible, but “no one 
would deny that . . . they had the right to buy and sell land without reference to their 
kin.”243  For most non-nobility, the “vital social bonds” in their lives were “not with an 
extended kinship group,”244 but rather with fellow community members.  Theirs was a 
highly mobile society in which most personal relationships were cultivated upon mutual 
interest, rather than inherited, and, correspondingly, where wealth was the most, perhaps 
only, reliable indicator of sociopolitical status. 
Part Five: Conclusion 
 
 The relative egalitarianism of Chinese property institutions is paradoxically 
explained by the prevalence and influence of kinship hierarchies in rural communities.  
This fundamentally revises the common perception that Chinese legal culture was one of 
caste-like inequality, socioeconomic stratification, and elite dominance.  Quite the 
contrary, especially when compared to corresponding institutions in early modern 
England, Chinese kinship and property norms encouraged macro-level status equality 
between economic classes and, consequently, afforded stronger protection to lower 
income households.  Although English law and custom had done away with most feudal 
indentures by the 17
th
 Century, law and custom continued to embrace wealth-based 
inequality in both status distribution and substantive property law.  In comparison, by 
overriding wealth-based status inequality with “Confucian” kinship hierarchies, Chinese 
social norms actually promoted substantive socioeconomic equality. 
 Although this thesis focuses on social norms and customary law, the state has 
hardly been invisible.  State support was clearly an important reason why kinship 
hierarchies were so embedded in Chinese society.
245
  Likewise, the consolidation of 
sociopolitical power in the English landed classes benefitted from state expansion after 
the Black Death.  If legal authorities often took a back seat to social norms in direct 
regulation of land transaction, they were certainly center-stage in shaping the status 
distribution norms that underlay those norms.  Quite ironically for Qing and Republican 
governments, property customs created under the influence of state-sponsored kinship 
norms often contradicted, indeed overrode, official property regulations.  Many would 
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argue that the early modern English state behaved more consistently: both its status 
redistribution efforts and its forays into substantive property regulation—tenancy, 
mortgages, and so on—usually favored higher-income households.246  This contrast was 
not, however, due to any difference in the economic composition of officials: wealthy 
families dominated government ranks in both countries.  More likely, it stemmed from 
differences in sociolegal culture, in what were internally understood to be the proper 
norms of status distribution. 
 The theoretical implications of this thesis are expansive.  It urges, first of all, a 
reassessment of “Confucianism” and “Confucian” social hierarchies.  Since at least the 
early 20
th
 Century, Chinese intellectuals have viciously attacked what they perceived as 
“feudal” (“fengjian”) norms of “Confucian” hierarchy, which purportedly led to moral 
bankruptcy and the ruthless oppression of lower-income classes by a combination of 
large landowners, merchants, literati gentry, and perpetually corrupt government 
officials.
247
  Despite—or perhaps because of—the deep politicization of these ideas, they 
remain tremendously influential in the Chinese academic world even today, enjoying 
deep support among both self-identified Marxists and liberals.
248
  At the same time, they 
also continue to have surprising traction with Western intellectuals, many of whom have 
yet to advance substantively beyond the Weber and Wittfogel stereotypes of 
“Confucianism” as either fundamentally “irrational” or “despotic.”249 
 The conclusions presented here suggest that this stereotype is deeply flawed: 
Especially when compared to corresponding English norms, kinship hierarchies in both 
North China and the Lower Yangtze promoted, not suppressed, the cumulative 
sociopolitical status of lower-income households, facilitating the creation of property 
institutions that protected their economic interests against those of wealthier households.  
In fact, the closer real-life kinship organization resembled the Confucian ideal of strict 
ordering by generational seniority, the stronger its egalitarian socioeconomic effects: the 
comparison between Lower Yangtze and South China lineages is particularly 
illuminating.  Interestingly, this does not necessarily exonerate kinship hierarchies from 
accusations of damaging economic growth.  As I have argued elsewhere, the 
egalitarianism of “dian” and tenancy customs unfortunately deepened the relative 
underdevelopment of Chinese capitalism—whereas the harshness of English land 
customs towards smallholders and tenants was actually a long-term economic asset.
250
  
Be as that may, if the primary economic problem with Confucian kinship hierarchies was 
that they were inefficiently benign towards the poor, then that already differs deeply from 
the conventional stereotype. 
Along the way, this article has presented a substantially more ambitious—both 
theoretically and empirically—account of how property norms were shaped and reshaped 
in early modern China than is available in previous scholarship.  It demonstrates how 
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rationalistic self-interest and internalized kinship norms operated on different levels, and 
at different stages, of the norm-making process, indeed across different geographical 
regions and in an era of intense political turmoil and rapid economic change.  More 
abstractly, it illustrates how internalized norms of status distribution influence, even 
predetermine, the rational and self-interested negotiation of property norms.  The 
comparison with early modern England further diversifies the geographical and temporal 
applicability of this basic model. 
The apparent ability to explain property institutions across highly diverse cultural 
and economic terrain hints, however tentatively, at the model’s broader theoretical 
significance: While this article only demonstrates that sociological internalization and 
economic rationality can coexist and interact in social norm creation—in fact quite 
consistently with the hitherto empirically unproven “pyramid of norms” thesis251—a 
bigger question is how often they do so.  Are most, perhaps even all, property norms the 
product of such interaction?  Should we therefore explore “cultural paradigms” that 
explain divergent property norms in different societies, both historical and contemporary, 
even if we acknowledge that the immediate individual reaction to property institutions is 
one of economic self-interest?  Ultimately, how much should we “culturalize” the law 
and economic analysis of property?
252
  At the very least, this article shows that, for those 
willing to work across academic disciplines and geographic boundaries, the analytical 
tools and empirical material to address these questions are readily available. 
 
                                                     
251
 See sources at supra note 27. 
252
 There is, of course, a growing “law and culture” literature that attempts to “culturalize” the economic 
analysis of law, if not directly within the realm of property law.  See Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism 
in Law and Economics, 91 BOSTON. UNIV. L. REV. 43 (2011); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New 
Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003); Lan Cao, Culture 
Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L. L. 357 (2007); Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 
BUFFALO L. REV. 511 (2009); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the 
Technicalities, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 973 (2005). 
